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I.

INTRODUCTION

When I surveyed the landscape in 1999, I discovered that “only
fourteen states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government” had
laws to compensate individuals who had been unjustly convicted and later
exonerated.1 Of those, few provided generous awards.2 Most offered
compensation so skimpy as to be insulting.3 Many statutes were virtually
inaccessible because they required a gubernatorial pardon.4 To make
matters worse, some contain inartful language, which permits states to
argue that a person who confessed or entered a plea of guilty should be
disqualified from recovering—even if the confession or plea was clearly
false.5

1.
Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails:
Indemnification for Unjust
Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 77 (1999).
2.
See id. at 105-08 (discussing limitations on awards).
3.
See id. at 105 (“Many states severely and unnecessarily limit the amount
of recoverable damages.”). In 1999, California limited awards to $10,000—no matter
how long the claimant had spent in prison. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4900-4906
(West 1941)). The statute was amended in 2000 to permit awards of $100 for each day
of wrongful incarceration. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West Supp. 2004).
4.
The following states require a pardon: California, CAL. PENAL CODE §
4900 (West 2003); Illinois, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 1999); Maine,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8241(2)(C) (West 2003); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501(b) (2001); and North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-82
(2003).
5.
The following states disqualify persons who have pled guilty or who have
in some way contributed to their own convictions: California, see CAL. PENAL CODE §
4902 (West 2000) (putting the burden on the claimant to prove “he did not . . .
contribute to the bringing about of his arrest or conviction for the crime with which he
was charged”); Iowa, see IOWA CODE § 663A.1(1)(b) (2003) (requiring that the
claimant did not plead guilty in order to qualify as wrongfully convicted); New York,
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After the publication of When Justice Fails, I anticipated that the
continuing parade of exonerations, in state after state across the country,6
would prompt local legislatures to enact new statutes benefiting the
unjustly convicted and later exonerated in states that lacked such
mechanisms and to modernize imperfect statutes in states where
compensation statutes had not been revisited in years. I was wrong.
In the last five years, just two additional states—Alabama7 and
Oklahoma8—have created generous compensation systems, despite new
studies showing that there may be thousands of innocent people wrongly
convicted and sentenced to jail.9 Only four states—California,10 Illinois,11
Ohio,12 and Texas13—have raised dollar limitations on statutory
compensation awards.14 Other states have engaged in protracted battles
over legislation, without resolving the disputes.15

see N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 8-b(4)(b) (McKinney 1989) (stating that the claimant
must prove “he did not by his own conduct cause or bring about his conviction”); New
Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-3(b) (West 2001) (same); Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2743.48(A)(2) (Anderson 2000 & Supp. 2002) (requiring that the claimant did
not plead guilty in order to qualify as wrongfully convicted); West Virginia, see W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a(e)(3) (Michie 2000) (stating that the claimant must not have “by
his own conduct cause[d] or br[ought] about his conviction”); and Wisconsin, see WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2001) (awarding compensation only if the claimant “did
not by his or her act or failure to act contribute to bring about the conviction and
imprisonment for which he or she seeks compensation”). The federal compensation
statute likewise excludes those who “by misconduct or neglect” caused their own
prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 2513 (2000).
6.
As of April 13, 2004, the Innocence Project at the Cardozo School of Law
had assisted in the exoneration of 143 wrongfully convicted individuals. INNOCENCE
PROJECT, at http://innocenceproject.org/index.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2004).
7.
ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-150 to -165 (2003).
8.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, 154(B)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
9.
Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thousands of False Convictions, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A15 (discussing a study published by Professor Samuel Gross
of the University of Michigan).
10.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004).
11.
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 1999).
12.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2) (Anderson 2000 & Supp. 2002).
13.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 103.052 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
14.
Tennessee’s House and Senate have voted to amend the state statute so as
to permit awards of up to a million dollars. H.B. 2859, 103d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2004) (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-108(a)(7) (2003)). The bill is currently
awaiting the signature of the Speaker of the House and the Governor. Interview with
Vanessa Potkin, Staff Attorney, The Innocence Project (May 26, 2004).
15.
In 2003, the following states introduced compensation bills: Pennsylvania,
H.B. 1281, 187th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); Louisiana, S.B. 520, 2003 Leg.,
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Even more dishearteningly, since 1999, several states have enacted
legislation designed not to assist exonerees in a significant way, but only to
bestow symbolic token support.16
For example, Montana’s new
“compensation” statute provides only tuition support—no monetary
assistance.17
Some states seem to have been designed to protect states against
envisioned civil litigation. For example, if Missouri Senate Bill 916
becomes law, Missouri will compensate for economic loss only and will
limit economic loss to the amount of income the federal government
regards as the poverty level plus twenty percent.18 Moreover, the statute
would specifically forbid a monetary award to compensate for loss of civil
rights and emotional duress resulting from the wrongful incarceration.19
Noneconomic loss would be compensated exclusively by job skills training,
therapy, or other social service programs.20 Virginia has amended its code
to compensate exonerees by awarding only an amount equal to “90% of
the Virginia per capita personal income as reported by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis of the United States Department of Commerce for
each year, or portion thereof, of incarceration up to 20 years.”21 Receipt of
the award will act as a waiver of the right to sue.22 These cynical, protective
statutes do not reflect public opinion as expressed by the media, and are
inconsistent with other progressive reform efforts motivated by
exonerations across the country.23
Reg. Sess. (La. 2003); Kentucky, H.B. 525, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2003); Mississippi,
S.B. 2015, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2003); Massachusetts, H.B. 2506, 183d Gen. Ct.,
Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003). Kentucky also introduced a bill in 2004. S.B. 272, 2004 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2004).
16.
MT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2003); S.B. 916, 92d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2004); H.B. 638, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2004); S.B. 271, 2004 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Va. 2004).
17.
MT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214.
18.
S.B. 916 (“Economic injury shall be the aggregate of the person’s
compensation for each year of incarceration based annually on the federal poverty
level as defined by section 215.235, RsMo, plus twenty percent.”).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
H.B. 638; S.B. 271.
22.
H.B. 638; S.B. 271.
23.
Exonerations have exposed faults in many traditional police procedures.
Criminal justice activists are encouraging radical reform. In some localities, that
reform is happening. Police departments are experimenting with lineup procedures.
New Jersey is urging its police to use sequential lineups when possible. See generally
JOHN J. FARMER, JR., ATTORNEY GEN., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., ATTORNEY
GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LINEUP

BERNHARD 5.2.DOC

2004]

8/24/2004 3:27:13 PM

Justice Still Fails

707

As a result of states’ reluctance to compensate, more exonerees are
turning to the courts for vindication. Despite the difficulty of bringing
lawsuits using tort theory or the civil rights laws, exonerees are increasingly
suing defense lawyers, police, prosecutors, and the agencies that supervise
and train them.24 Thus far, litigation has yielded mixed results. Few
exonerated individuals have been compensated.25 And, while many have
received nothing, others, no more deserving, have received enormous
awards.26 The disparity is discouraging for those who have not been
compensated, complicates the debate over whether and how exonerees
should be compensated, and symbolizes the arbitrariness and inequality of
the criminal justice system as a whole.
With this Article, I hope to motivate state legislators to enact
responsible, practical compensation statutes and encourage courts to
entertain state law and civil rights claims brought by those who have been
unjustly convicted and later exonerated. I begin by looking at the reasons

IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES,
available
at
http:/www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf. (Apr. 18, 2001). Certain localities
are recording police interrogations. Courts have required the change in two states:
Alaska, Stephen v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Alaska 1985); and Minnesota, State v.
Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1994). In Illinois, the legislature is moving to
require recording. S.B. 15, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003). Crime
laboratories may be subjected to standards and serious peer review. For example, after
Jimmy Ray Bromgard was exonerated in Montana, after serving over fifteen years in
prison for a crime he did not commit, a panel of expert forensic scientists reviewed the
work of the forensic scientist who had allegedly “matched” hairs found at the crime
scene to Mr. Bromgard.
INNOCENCE PROJECT, JIMMY RAY BROMGARD, at
http://www.innocence project.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004).
The panel found the work unscientific, as well as wrong and urged the Attorney
General to create an audit committee to examine the full body of the scientist’s police
work. Id.
24.
See Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of
“Innocence Commissions” in America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 104-05 (2002) (noting the
lack of success of exonerees’ civil rights suits against law enforcement officers and
prosecutors).
25.
See Howard S. Master, Note, Revisiting the Takings-Based Argument for
Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 97, 98 (2004)
(stating that the vast majority of exonerees have been left uncompensated due to the
absence of statutes and “[e]xisting constitutional and common-law tort doctrines”).
26.
For example, Mark Bravo was awarded seven million dollars for three
years he spent in jail for a crime he did not commit. Monte Morin, He’s got 7 Million
Ways to Tell Her ‘I Love You’, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at B21. James Newsome was
awarded fifteen million dollars in damages. Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 307
(7th Cir. 2003) (affirming a jury verdict awarding Newsome one million dollars for each
of the fifteen years he served in jail).
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for enacting compensation statutes: uniformity, practicality, popular
support, and fairness. Next, I dissect the arguments raised by opponents.
Finally, I turn to recent judicial decisions hinting that courts may be
stepping in where legislatures fear to tread.
II.

COMPENSATION STATUTES

The reticence of state governments to assist the unjustly convicted is
surprising. The arguments in favor of uniform compensation schemes are
logically and emotionally persuasive. As I wrote in 1999:
The necessary law is simple, clear and effective. The remedy is not
expensive and does not require creation of new bureaucratic agencies.
Most importantly, a legislative remedy is the only reliable and fair
response to the inevitable mistakes that occur as a byproduct of the
operation of a criminal justice system as large as ours. The state whose
actions have put individuals in prison for crimes they did not commit
owes a debt to those who through no fault of their own have lost years
and opportunity. The debt should be recognized and paid.27

A. Statutes Create a Uniform Approach to Compensating the Unjustly
Convicted
Compensation statutes bring rationality to a situation that is
otherwise more akin to a lottery or popularity contest. In states without a
uniform system for compensating those who have been wrongly convicted,
similarly situated individuals can be treated very differently. Georgia, for
example, lacks a uniform legislative compensation system. As a result,
exonerees have the choice of bringing a lawsuit28 or finding a sponsor
willing to introduce a private bill in the legislature.29 As of March 1, 2004,
at least three individuals in Georgia had been exonerated.30
27.
28.

Bernhard, supra note 1, at 73-74.
Courts are just beginning to relax the barriers that have discouraged
lawsuits seeking redress for unjust conviction. See discussion infra Part II.
29.
Private legislative bills “are specially drafted acts generally used to pay
otherwise unenforceable claims on behalf of individuals harmed by the state.”
Bernhard, supra note 1, at 93.
30.
INNOCENCE PROJECT, CALVIN JOHNSON, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004);
INNOCENCE PROJECT, DOUGLAS ECHOLS, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004);
INNOCENCE PROJECT, SAMUEL SCOTT, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004).
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In 1999, Calvin Johnson, a college-educated metro Atlanta man, was
released after 16 years in prison when DNA tests cleared him of rape
charges. Johnson’s positive, forgiving demeanor made him celebrated
on national TV. He got a MARTA job, $500,000 from the state, and
an apology from the district attorney. He has co-authored a book.31

A few years later, Sam Scott and Douglas Echols were cleared of a
1986 rape conviction by DNA testing.32 But, neither has received any
compensation.33 No lawsuits have been filed.34
No senators have
volunteered to introduce special bills.
It may be that the first exoneration grabs more media and public
attention. It may be that Calvin Johnson is more personable and attractive
than either Echols or Scott. However, those distinctions do not justify the
difference in treatment. If there were a uniform statute, each exoneree
could file a claim. The effects of politics and personality would be
minimized.
B. Statutes Are Easy to Use and Resolve Claims Rapidly
After fourteen years in prison, Larry David Holdren obtained
permission to retest the forensic evidence material to his conviction.35
Testing proved that he was not responsible for the crime.36 In 1999, courts
reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment against him.37 By
then, Mr. Holdren was forty-four years old.38
He brought a claim under the West Virginia compensation statute.39
Simply by reading Holdren’s uncontested petition, the West Virginia Court
of Claims concluded the state was liable for the wrongful conviction.40
31.
Bill Torpy, Free Men, Lost Identities; DNA Cleared Them, but Prison Left
Mark, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 5, 2003, at D1.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Holdren v. State, No. CC-00-461 (W. Va. Ct. Cl. Apr. 2, 2002), available at
http://129.71.164.29/Court_Claims/CC-00-191.htm.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. To make a compensation most practicable, the official record from the
prison system confirming the time served in prison, paired with the judgment reversing
the conviction and dismissing the indictment, should be sufficient to bring the claim
before the court or administrative agency charged with considering the issue. See, e.g.,
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Turning to damages, the court pointed out that Mr. Holdren had spent
fifteen years in prison and had been enrolled in an undergraduate
university program at the time of his arrest.41 The court heard an
economist estimate what Mr. Holdren might have been expected to earn
during the fifteen years if his career plans had progressed uninterrupted.42
The court considered the claimant’s “impairment of future earnings . . . , as
well as the loss of reputation, the loss of liberty, emotional stress, pain and
suffering, and the reputation of the particular facility in which the claimant
was imprisoned in determining the amount of the award.”43 Finally, the
court recognized that the claimant had already partially recovered through
a civil action against a third party and took that into consideration in
estimating damages.44 In a two-and-one-half-page decision, the court
determined that the claimant was entitled to an award of $1,650,000,
approximately $110,000 for each year spent in prison.45
Although some might complain that the award was too low, the
claimant recovered relatively quickly and without having to finance
complicated litigation. He was not required to obtain a pardon, which
might have been impossible. Finally, the damages, while not copious, were
sufficient to permit Mr. Holdren to complete school, purchase a home, or
invest in a business should he so desire—activities he certainly would have
enjoyed had he not been falsely accused and imprisoned. The award could
finance the psychological therapy so many of the exonerated need.46 The
award provided a foundation upon which to begin to build a life.

W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 14-2-13a(d) (Michie 2000) (setting forth evidence required to
make a claim for unjust imprisonment). The proof that convinced the prosecution and
the court to dismiss should, in most cases, also establish liability. If the claimant’s
innocence (and thus the state’s liability) is disputed, a factual hearing must be held. In
those circumstances, most states require the claimant to prove innocence by clear and
convincing evidence. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-422 (2004) (stating that a person
bringing suit for damages under D.C.’s unjust imprisonment statute must prove by
clear and convincing evidence he or she was unjustly imprisoned); W. VA. CODE ANN.
14-2-13a(a), (f) (outlining what a claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence
to show unjust imprisonment).
41.
Holdren v. State, No. CC-00-461.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
See id. (granting an award of $1,650,000).
46.
The PBS Frontline special documentary, Burden of Innocence, detailed
the many problems faced by those who have served time for crimes they did not
commit. Frontline: Burden of Innocence (PBS television broadcast May 1, 2003),
available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/burden/view.
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C. Compensation Statutes Are Popular
Any study of wrongful convictions will find innumerable media
stories sympathetic to those who have been wrongly convicted.47 If the
number and length of newspaper, radio, and television stories reflect the
interest of the community, not only do exoneration narratives have
immense human interest value,48 but the public overwhelmingly supports
providing assistance to those who have been harmed by the criminal justice
system through no fault of their own. Ofra Bikel has produced three
documentaries on wrongful convictions for the Public Broadcasting Service
(PBS).49 Her most recent program, Burden of Innocence, detailed the
difficulties faced after release from unjust incarceration and explicitly
called for compensation legislation.50 The North Carolina Winston-Salem
Journal ran an eight-part series on Darryl Hunt’s twenty-year sojourn from
accusation to exoneration.51 The newspaper’s website provides links to
stories, video interviews with witnesses, photographs of the evidence
introduced at trial, and the actual documents used to win Hunt’s release.52
It closes with a quote from the local district attorney, Tom Keith, who
finally acquiesced to the exoneration and recommended that Darryl Hunt
be compensated: “It is important that the system make amends for the
system.”53

47.
I have been interviewed numerous times by reporters curious about
whether persons who have been unjustly convicted and later exonerated will receive
compensation. When I inform them that few are, the reporters are inevitably shocked.
48.
The Pulitzer Prize has been awarded twice to newspaper reporters for
investigative journalism leading to the exoneration of individuals convicted of serious
crimes. Paul Henderson of the Seattle Times won in 1982 for reporting that proved the
innocence of a man convicted of rape, 1982, at http://www.pulitizer.org (last visited
Apr. 22, 2004), and John Woestendiek of the Philadelphia Inquirer won in 1987 for
reporting that included proving the innocence of a man convicted of murder, 1987, at
http://www.pulitizer.org (last visited Apr. 22, 2004).
49.
Frontline, supra note 46.
50.
Id.
51.
See Murder, Race, Justice: The State v. Darryl Hunt, The Stories, at
http://darrylhunt.journalnow.com/frontStories.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2004)
(providing information about the series authored by Phoebe Zerwick).
52.
See Murder, Race, Justice:
The State v. Darryl Hunt, at
http://darrylhunt.journalnow.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2004).
53.
Phoebe Zerwick, Keith to Plead for a Hunt Pardon, WINSTON-SALEM J.,
Feb. 19, 2004, available at http://darrylhunt.com/epilogue/epilogueprint41.html.
Numerous other print journalists have made the same pitch. E.g., Lou Hanson, Bring
Uniformity to Compensation Bills, VIRGINIAN PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Jan. 12, 2004, at
B10; Brendan McCarthy, House Passes Wrongful Conviction Bill, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 23, 2003, at B4; Curtis Stephen, Wrongly Imprisoned Deserve Compensation,

BERNHARD 5.2.DOC

712

8/24/2004 3:27:13 PM

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 52

Popular support is largely responsible for the few new statutes
enacted in the past five years. Despite five exonerations, Alabama had no
uniform compensation system until the media focused on the case of
Walter McMillian.54 When Walter McMillian was finally released from
prison,55 after revelations that police had coerced a confession from the
“witness” who implicated him and failed to disclose other exculpatory
information to the defendant,56 the Birmingham News published a series of
articles and editorials.57 Only then did Alabama enact a statute that

NEWSDAY (Long Island, N.Y.), Feb. 17, 2004, at A23; John Wilkens, Freedom From
Prison is Little Relief for the Falsely Accused, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 15, 2003,
at E1; Andrew Wolfson, Kentucky, Indiana Not Among States Compensating
Exonerated Inmates, COURIER J. (Louisville, Ky.), July 1, 2001, at 1A.
54.
LaJuana S. Davis, Discovery in Criminal Cases: Obtaining Evidence and
Information Necessary for an Effective Defense, 58 ALA. LAW. 352, 352 (1997). Mr.
McMillan’s conviction was reversed on appeal. McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993). The five prior exonerations included: Clarence Brandley, who had
spent nearly ten years in prison, most of it on death row, until he was exonerated in
1990, e.g., Betty B. Fletcher, The Death Penalty in America: Can Justice Be Done?, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 822 (1995) (citing MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF
INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 119-36 (1992)); Randall
Padgett, who was acquitted after his capital murder conviction and death sentence
were overturned in 1995, e.g., Taylor Bright, Guilty Until Proven Innocent?,
POST-HERALD,
available
at
BIRMINGHAM
http://www.patrickcrusade.org/execution_2_5.htm (last visited May 28, 2004); Ronnie
Mahan and Dale Mahan, who had spent over twelve years in prison before they were
released in 1998, after the help of the Innocence Project in New York and DNA
evidence established their innocence, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, DALE MAHAN, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2004);
and Freddie Lee Gaines, who was convicted of two murders in 1972 and not released
until 1985, e.g., After 13 Years in Prison, Innocent Man Says Alabama ‘Owes Me’, CHI.
TRIB., Feb. 14, 1991, at 26, available at 1991 WL 9350750. Five years later, another
man confessed to the crimes. Id. Of all these exonerees, only Freddie Gaines was
compensated. See Phillip Rawls, Legislature Votes to Give $1 Million to Wrongfully
Convicted Minister, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 9, 1996, available at 1996 WL 4428836
(outlining the compensation received by Gaines). In 1996, the Alabama Legislature
passed a private bill awarding Gaines $100,000 per year for ten years. Id.
55.
McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d at 949 (reversing the conviction because
McMillian was denied due process of law).
56.
Mr. McMillian was convicted of capital murder and spent six years on
death row before an attorney representing him on appeal made a startling discovery.
See Davis, supra note 54, at 352. Counsel was listening to a cassette tape that recorded
statements made by one of the state’s main witnesses. Id. The statement ended before
the tape switched off, but counsel did not jump up immediately to stop the tape player.
Id. After a few minutes, the witness’s voice returned—only now, he was complaining
that the police were forcing him to implicate McMillian. Id.
57.
E.g., Editorial, Just Compensation Panel on Wrongful Convictions Should
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requires the state to pay a minimum of $50,000 dollars per year to anyone
who has been wrongly convicted and later exonerated.58
Similarly, in Ohio, the limits on compensation awards were raised
from a cap of $25,000, plus lost wages and attorney fees, to $40,333 a year,
plus lost wages,59 after a series of prizewinning newspaper articles by
Connie Schultz in the Cleveland Plain Dealer.60 If the press represents
public opinion, the public supports laws that provide fair and reasonable
compensation for those who have been unjustly convicted and later
exonerated.
D. The Opposition to a Legislative Solution
State lawmakers who have tried to generate interest in compensation
statutes report that the opposition raises two arguments.61 First, some
contend that the statutes will be increasingly expensive as an ever larger
number of exonerees petition for awards.62 Second, opponents warn that
undeserving individuals will recover.63 Both threats are unfounded.
1.

Cost

Even in states with inflated prison populations and a vast criminal
justice system, the number of individuals who are not only innocent, but
who have the means to establish their innocence is small and getting

Determine Pay, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 16, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library,
U.S. Newspapers File; David White, Ex-Death Row Inmate Awaits Compensation,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, May 30, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, U.S.
Newspapers File; David White, Wrongfully Jailed Favor Review Panel, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Apr. 10, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, U.S. Newspapers File.
58.
ALA. CODE § 29-2-159 (2003).
59.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2)(b)-(d) (Anderson 2000).
60.
See Burden of Innocence: A Special Series from the Plain Dealer, at
http://www.cleveland.com/burden (last visited Apr. 22, 2004) (providing links to the
articles in the series). “‘The Burden of Innocence’ was a five-day series about Michael
Green, who was falsely convicted of rape. After the series was published, another man,
Rodney Rhines, came forward and confessed to the 1989 crime. Rhines subsequently
was convicted and is now in prison.” Series Earns Citations, PD Staffers Win Awards,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Mar. 8, 2003, at B1.
61.
Interview with Ann Lambert, Legislative Counsel, ACLU of Mass. (Jan.
2004); Interview with Sharon Bivens, Alabama Legislative Fiscal Office (Aug. & Sept.
2000).
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
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smaller.64 Most postconviction exonerations have been won through DNA
testing,65 and even a quick look at a “typical” DNA case reveals why the
numbers of exonerations will decrease. In each DNA exoneration, the
actual perpetrator of the crime left DNA, in some form, at the scene of the
crime.66 In order to impact the verdict postconviction, the DNA must
survive to be retested years later. 67
The “typical” DNA exoneration is a rape case, in which the rapist
ejaculates in or around the victim and leaves the scene. The victim reports
the rape, is examined by a doctor, and a rape kit is prepared. The kit
64.
Most exonerations have occurred in Illinois, where there have been
twenty-three.
See
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
CASE
PROFILES,
at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE PROFILES], for the stories of the twenty-three
Illinois exonerees. New York has had fourteen, and Texas and Virginia have had
thirteen. Id. After that, the number of exonerations in each state drops dramatically:
Oklahoma (8); Massachusetts (9); Pennsylvania (6); California (6); West Virginia (6);
Indiana (4); Michigan and Ohio (4). Id. The remaining states have had only one, two,
or three exonerations.
65.
INNOCENCE PROJECT, CAUSES AND REMEDIES OF WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, at http://www.innocenceproject.org. Of course, innocent people have
been exonerated without DNA evidence.
See generally EDWIN BORCHARD,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY
(1957); MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992). Witnesses
recant. Actual perpetrators confess. Undisclosed exculpatory material so substantially
undercuts the reliability of the conviction that courts feel compelled to vacate
convictions. Many of the mid-1980s child sex abuse convictions have been reversed as
courts and the public have learned to mistrust the testimony of young children and of
self-styled child sex abuse therapists. See generally RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN
WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY, AND SEXUAL
HYSTERIA (1994); Dorothy Rabinowitz, Reckoning in Wenatchee, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
1999, at A26 (documenting myriad reversals of trial court convictions stemming from
townwide accusations by two child witnesses); Paul Craig Roberts, Saved by Pursuit of
the Truth, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2000, at A16 (discussing false allegations of child
abuse). However, the number of non-DNA exonerations will never be large because it
is so difficult to reverse a conviction without absolute evidence of innocence.
66.
DNA is found in serological material such as blood, semen, saliva, sweat,
and other bodily fluids.
67.
To overturn a verdict based on postconviction DNA testing, the DNA
must also be “material” to the verdict. In the “typical” scenario, when the real
perpetrator left DNA in semen, the DNA is clearly material in that it directly affects
the ultimate decision regarding guilt or innocence. DNA might not be material, if, for
example, there was semen found in a rape victim’s vagina, but the rape victim had
testified that the rapist used a condom and explained the presence of semen as a result
of her earlier consensual sexual activity with another person. In such a case, the fact
that the DNA in the semen failed to match the person convicted of the crime would be
irrelevant.
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preserves samples of the perpetrator’s semen. The victim later identifies
someone she believes is the perpetrator. The accused is subsequently
charged, and possibly convicted, based on that testimony. The serological
material contained in the rape kit may have been produced at trial to
establish that a rape occurred, or to show that the perpetrator and the
accused shared a common blood type. No DNA testing would have been
done because that procedure was not available at the time of the criminal
investigation. The accused is sentenced to prison. Years later, when DNA
testing becomes available, the rape kit is found, and the collected material
is analyzed. It shows that the convicted person is not the perpetrator. This
“typical” scenario is less likely to occur in the future than it has in the past,
simply because DNA testing can now be accomplished during the
investigatory stage of a case.68
Nevertheless, there are still individuals in prison waiting to establish
their innocence through DNA testing. Some are fighting to have tests
conducted. Tests cost money that must be raised. Others are hoping to
locate the crucial evidence. Also, some recent convictions are newly
subject to challenge as the result of ever improving technology. The ability
to conduct DNA testing on trace amounts of biological material—e.g.,
sweat clinging to clothing or saliva stuck to cigarettes—has improved,69 and
minute amounts of DNA can now be grown to a sufficient size to make
testing possible.70 Overall, however, the rate of DNA exonerations will
inevitably slow. The number of convicted inmates who can locate material,
relevant, and untested forensic material will dwindle, as will the number of
individuals claiming compensation for unjust conviction.
Furthermore, even in states with the greatest number of exonerations,
the cost of compensating deserving individuals has been minimal. In New
68.
Naturally, there may be any number of innocent individuals in prison
unable to win their freedom because rape kits or other physical evidence have been
destroyed. Moreover, most cases—e.g., robberies, thefts, or drug offenses—involve no
testable material. In those situations, innocent people are rarely able to establish their
innocence.
69.
BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED
67-69 (2000).
70.
Id. at 36-40. The polymerase chain reaction (PCR), invented by Kary
Mullis in 1983, is a process by which certain chemicals are added to a single gene or
fragment of DNA, causing the DNA to replicate itself exponentially so there is more of
the substance to test. Kary Mullis, The Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), at
http://www.karymullis.com (last visited June 5, 2004). As a result, even if only a tiny
fragment of DNA is recovered, the PCR technique can be used to exonerate a
defendant. Id.
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York State, for example, the court of claims has resolved 214 wrongful
conviction claims since New York’s compensation statute was enacted in
1984.71 Of that number, 154 cases were dismissed, and nineteen others
were settled out of court.72 In only twelve cases did the court actually make
an award, and then, for an average of just $457,000 per case.73
2.

Risk of Rewarding Individuals Responsible for Their Own Convictions

Despite our national rhetoric, generally anyone arrested and accused
of a serious crime is presumed to be guilty.74 Once a police investigation
focuses on a suspect, that person is never again viewed without suspicion.
Acquittals are not equivalent to a declaration of innocence.75 An acquittal
means only that the prosecution failed to meet its burden. Persons who
have served time in prison convicted of crimes they did not commit report
that the communities into which they are released view them with disbelief
or even fear, despite their well-publicized exoneration.76
Bias against those who have been accused and reluctance to accept
the possibility of mistake color prosecutorial attitudes toward
compensation legislation. Even when DNA evidence clearly exonerates,
prosecutors have trouble admitting that they convicted the wrong person.77
71.
72.
73.
74.

Stephen, supra note 53, at A23.
Id.
Id.
William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 334
(1995) (citing to a number of scholarly works that document the pervasive presumption
of guilt following arrest).
75.
Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1323 (1997) (citing United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)).
76.
I have experienced this phenomenon myself. I represent Dennis
Halstead, who, along with his codefendants, John Restivo and John Kogut, was
released from prison in July 2003 after serving almost eighteen years in prison, when
the Nassau County District Attorney agreed to vacate his conviction. The charges
against Mr. Halstead and his codefendants are still pending, despite DNA evidence
establishing their innocence. While waiting for one of the court proceedings, I
overheard the judge’s secretary express fear because one of the defendants was moving
to his mother’s home, which was located down the block from where the secretary’s
mother lives. For other examples, see SCHECK ET AL., supra note 69, at 223-38.
77.
See generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance
to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004). In case after case,
even after DNA testing establishes that the convicted person could not have been the
perpetrator, normally logical prosecutors will spin increasingly implausible
explanations for the presence of the exculpatory material. For example, in the Darryl
Hunt case, the prosecutor argued in summation that Mr. Hunt had raped the victim,
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On the other hand, it is legitimate to guard against recovery by
individuals whose behavior impeded the “truth-seeking” function of a
police investigation, just as the doctrine of comparative negligence works
to limit damage awards for those who are partially responsible for their
own injury.78 Unfortunately, the vague and inchoate suspicion of anyone
who has been arrested, prosecuted, and convicted, even if falsely, tends to
infect the drafting process so that the most frequent disqualifications are
not logically related to legitimate concerns.
For example, lawmakers and lobbyists for prosecutors sometimes
demand that compensation legislation exclude from possible recovery
those individuals who have contributed to their own conviction.79 The two
types of contributory behavior most frequently identified in a statute as
disqualifications are confessions and guilty pleas.80 Neither should suffice,
without more.
a. Confessions.
New York’s compensation statute precludes
recovery for those who “by [their] own conduct cause or bring about [their]
conviction.”81 That disqualification has been interpreted to bar persons
who have given an uncoerced confession or plead guilty. Drafters of New
York’s statute82 explained that the disqualification was intended to require

ejaculated inside her, and then stabbed her to death. Phoebe Zerwick, State: DNA
Results Irrelevant; Scientific Evidence Shows Semen in Sykes Case Was Not That of
Hunt or Other Possible Suspects, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 22, 2003, available at
http://darrylhunt.journalnow.com/stories/partseven/story/html. When the DNA tests
proved that Mr. Hunt had not been the rapist, the prosecutor argued—in complete
contradiction to his previous statements—that Mr. Hunt must have restrained and
stabbed the victim while someone else committed the rape. Id. Only when the police
matched the DNA to another person—who immediately confessed to committing the
crime on his own—did the prosecutor admit it was wrong to convict Mr. Hunt.
Zerwick, supra note 53.
78.
57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 799 (2004); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 463 (1965) (“Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff
which falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and
which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant
in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm.”).
79.
Interview with Ann Lambert, supra note 61.
80.
See generally Adele Bernhard, Table, When Justice Fails: Indemnification
of Unjust Conviction, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 345 (2000) (summarizing the
various statutes).
81.
See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(4)(b), (5)(d) (McKinney 1989).
82.
In the early 1980s, New York Governor Mario Cuomo appointed legal
scholars, jurists, and practitioners to a Law Revision Commission that would consider
how and when to compensate individuals who had been unjustly convicted and later
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that
the person seeking damages . . . [must ] establish that he did not cause
or bring about his prosecution by reason of his own misconduct.
Examples of such misconduct would include falsely giving an
uncoerced confession of guilt, removing evidence, attempting to
induce a witness to give false testimony, attempting to suppress
testimony, or concealing the guilt of another.83

Of course, in 1984, when New York’s statute was enacted, no one
believed in the phenomenon of false confessions.84 The idea of a false
confession probably conjured the vision of a scoundrel sabotaging a police
investigation to protect fellow mobsters. Today, preventing individuals
from benefiting from their own intentional misconduct, such as inducing
others to give false testimony or hiding evidence, remains appropriate.85
But it no longer seems rational to consider all false confessions as
misconduct, because multiple exonerations prove that innocent people
falsely implicate themselves,86 despite gaining nothing for themselves in the
process.87 Social scientists have ideas about why individuals falsely confess,
exonerated. N.Y. STATE LAW REVISION COMM’N, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION
COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR ON REDRESS FOR INNOCENT PERSONS UNJUSTLY
CONVICTED AND SUBSEQUENTLY IMPRISONED, 1984 N.Y. Laws 2899.
83.
Id. at 2932.
84.
Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problems of False Confessions in
the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 910 (2004) (discussing the contemporary
phenomenon of false confessions and acknowledging that “most people do not appear
to know that interrogation-induced false confessions even exist”).
85.
Courts have dismissed claims for compensation when the claimant was
convicted after instructing his attorney not to let the defendant’s wife testify,
presumably because she was involved in the crime or because she had incriminating
testimony, e.g., Taylor v. State, 605 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d sub nom.
Williams v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1381, 1382 (N.Y. 1995), or when the claimant was not
guilty of the crime charged (scheme to defraud), but was guilty of larceny on the same
set of facts, e.g., Rogers v. State, 694 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878 (Ct. Cl. 1999), or when the
claimant knew the crime was committed by his twin brother, but refused to name him
and was convicted as a result, e.g., Stevenson v. State, 520 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494 (Ct. Cl.
1987), or when the claimant was convicted after proffering a false alibi, e.g., Moses v.
State, 523 N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (Ct. Cl. 1987).
86.
Patricia Smith, Brenton Butler Didn’t Do It, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Sept.
1, 2003, at 8, 8.
87.
Of the first 123 exonerations that the Innocence Project assisted, as of
March 4, 2004, thirty-three involved false confessions. INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE
PROFILES, supra note 64. See generally Drizin & Leo, supra note 84; Richard A. Leo &
Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
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but they do not understand all the dynamics involved.88 New York’s
statute should be amended to make clear that no category of persons will
be automatically excluded from recovery and that the circumstances of
each case will be individually considered.
False confessions can be either uncoerced or coerced. An uncoerced
false confession occurs when an individual, on his or her own independent
volition, perhaps driven by some personal psychological compulsion,
confesses to a crime he or she did not commit.89 An uncoerced false
confession could also result from an attempt to manipulate a police
investigation for some illegitimate purpose, such as protecting someone
else from investigation.
A coerced false confession generally results from police
interrogation.90 The same techniques that can induce true confessions can
cause false confessions. Often police are eager to solve a crime, convinced
that they have focused on the correct culprit, and aware that an admission
will help convince the prosecutor to charge the suspect. They may,
consciously or unconsciously, feed the target details of the crime so that the
resulting admission is convincingly accurate.91 In the next few years, as

CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
88.
Leo & Ofshe, supra note 87, at 431.
89.
See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160-67 (1986) (describing the
defendant’s confession as uncoerced when the defendant approached an off-duty
police officer and told the officer of his need to confess because his conscience was
troubling him).
90.
See,
e.g.,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT,
BRUCE
GODSCHALK,
at
http://www.innocence project.org/case/search_profiles.php (last visited Apr. 23, 2004)
(discussing the coerced confession of Bruce Godschalk).
91.
Police-induced false confessions arise when a suspect’s resistance to confession
is broken down as a result of poor police practice, overzealousness, criminal
misconduct and/or misdirected training. Interrogators sometimes become so
committed to closing a case that they improperly use psychological
interrogation techniques to coerce or persuade a suspect into giving a
statement that allows the interrogator to make an arrest. Sometimes police
become so certain of the suspect’s guilt that they refuse to even-handedly
evaluate new evidence or to consider the possibility that a suspect may be
innocent, even when all the case evidence has been gathered and
overwhelmingly demonstrates that the confession is false. Once a confession is
obtained, investigation often ceases, and convicting the defendant becomes the
only goal of both investigators and prosecutors. . . .
American police are poorly trained about the dangers of interrogation and
false confession. Rarely are police officers instructed in how to avoid eliciting
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more police precincts videotape interrogations, we will better understand
how and why individuals falsely confess.92
In the meantime, multiple exonerations have educated the public
about confessions. We no longer automatically accept as true a confession
that results from long hours of interrogation, false promises, and pressure
tactics, and we certainly do not hold innocent individuals who have been
coerced into falsely confessing responsible for their own convictions. The
fact that a young, mentally challenged, chemically dependant, submissive,
or just plain scared individual succumbs to police interrogation techniques
and confesses to a crime that he or she did not commit no longer seems like
misconduct that should prevent recovery years later when the truth finally
surfaces. Statutes should be amended to more accurately reflect current
social science.
The mere existence of an inculpatory statement or a confession
should never defeat a claim. Only an uncoerced false confession
specifically intended to distort the truth-seeking function of the police
investigation should prevent recovery.
In determining whether a
confession was the product of coercion, courts should presume all false
confessions to be the product of coercion unless they can be shown
otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, the results of a
pretrial ruling on the admissibility of the confession should be irrelevant.93
confessions, how to understand what causes false confessions, or how to
recognize the forms false confessions take or their distinguishing
characteristics. Instead, some interrogation manual writers and trainers persist
in the unfounded belief that contemporary psychological methods will not
cause the innocent to confess—a fiction so thoroughly contradicted by all of
the research on police interrogation that it can be labeled a potentially deadly
myth. This fiction perpetuates the commonly held belief that only torture can
cause an innocent suspect to confess, and it allows some police to rationalize
accepting coerced and demonstrably unreliable confession statements as true.

Leo & Ofshe, supra note 87, at 440-44 (footnotes omitted).
92.

Only four states and the city of Washington have decided to require
recorded interrogations . . . . The Center on Wrongful Convictions at
Northwestern University recently surveyed 238 law enforcement agencies
around the country that currently record the questioning of felony suspects. It
found that “virtually every officer with whom we spoke, having given custodial
recordings a try, was enthusiastically in favor of the practice.”

Editorial, Recording Police Questioning, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at A22, available at
LEXIS, News Library, N.Y. Times File; see supra note 23.
93.
See, e.g., Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he general
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The standard applied to determine admissibility at trial is whether the
statement was “voluntarily made.”94 In determining voluntariness, coercive
techniques are not necessarily determinative.95 As a result, although police
interrogation techniques may create false confessions, they do not always
render confessions “involuntary” as a matter of law or inadmissible at
trial.96 Thus, in the end, veracity is not a factor in the determination of
admissibility,97 and consequently, a pretrial ruling on admissibility should
play no role in deciding whether to award compensation.
b. Other Disqualifications: Guilty Pleas and Prior Convictions.
Guilty pleas should not be an automatic bar to recovery. Although most
unjustly convicted individuals chose to go to trial, a number have pled
guilty.98 Sometimes, individuals plead guilty at the insistence of counsel,
who may doubt their innocence and fear the worst outcome after trial.
Whether the plea was caused by the accused’s inability to understand or
assess his rights and predicament, or whether the plea was compelled by
counsel’s ineffectiveness, it should not act as a disqualification. Once
again, if it were determined that the plea was entered to intentionally
manipulate an ongoing investigation or to protect another from being
charged with the crime, that activity could act as a disqualification. But,
without evidence of illegitimate motive, when an innocent person pleads
guilty to a crime he or she did not commit, the plea is neither symptomatic
of unworthy behavior nor proof of complicity in the crime. Thus, any
rationale for using it as a disqualification falls away.
Finally, no claimant should be precluded from compensation because
of a prior felony conviction. Damages, of course, can be adjusted, so that a
rule is that a judgment which is vacated, for whatever reason, is deprived of its
conclusive effect as collateral estoppel.”).
94.
See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 303 (1991) (“The
admissibility of a confession . . . depends on whether it was voluntarily made.”).
95.
For example, in New York State, while physical threats will render a
resulting “confession” inadmissible, People v. Gaddy, 523 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (App. Div.
1987), false promises will not, People v. Richardson, 609 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (App. Div.
1994).
96.
See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 n.2 (1986) (“Even when
there is a causal connection between police misconduct and the defendant’s confession,
it does not automatically follow that there has been a violation of the Due Process
Clause.”) (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969)). Furthermore, the Court in
Connelly held that a confession’s lack of reliability “is a matter to be governed by the
evidentiary laws of the forum . . . and not by the Due Process Clause . . . .” Id. at 167.
97.
Id.
98.
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE PROFILES, supra note 64.
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person with a criminal record might recover less. Courts can award
damages according to the same equitable principles that guide the
assessment of damages in more routine personal injury actions.99 The
difficulty of putting a price tag on freedom or loss of opportunity does not
mean that courts are inept at the task.100
III. LITIGATION
Litigation is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive—even when
plaintiffs assert conventional and well-accepted legal claims.101 When a
plaintiff seeks vindication for a new category of harm or for a harm that
was previously unrecognized, such as wrongful conviction, that plaintiff
must formulate new legal strategies. Such creative litigation is challenging
indeed.
A. Preliminary Considerations
1.

Actionable Conduct102

Some wrongful convictions result from unfortunate, but inevitable
accidents for which no individual or entity can be blamed. Let us say that a
rape victim, shaky and understandably scared of all strange men, believes
that she glimpses her assailant standing on a dimly lit street corner near her
home. She calls the police and identifies the man she spots as the rapist.
On the basis of that information, the police have probable cause to
arrest.103 If the accused has no alibi, and there is no reason to doubt the

99.
New York decisions provide plenty of examples of judges wrestling with
the value of years lost and opportunities stolen. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 558
N.Y.S.2d 722, 725 (Ct. Cl. 1992) (awarding only $40,000 for wrongful conviction in light
of the claimant’s prior criminal record and numerous incarcerations).
100.
See id.
101.
Plaintiffs navigate legal minefields to recover damages when police and
prosecutors (and the cities, counties, and municipalities that hire, train, and supervise
them) cause harm, even when the harm consists of such routine abuses of power as:
excessive force, warrantless search, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. See
generally MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:1
(3d ed. 1999); SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:
THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2003).
102.
The titles of the sub-sub-headings under the sub-heading Preliminary
Considerations are borrowed from chapter titles in AVERY ET AL., supra note 101.
103.
Generally, a finding of probable cause precludes a determination of
malicious prosecution. E.g., Wasilewicz v. Vill. of Monroe Police Dep’t, 771 N.Y.S.2d
170, 171 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Gisondi v. Town of Harrison, 528 N.E.2d 157 (N.Y.
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victim’s sanity or powers of observation, her accusation will undoubtedly
evolve into a prosecution. The accused may easily be convicted, even
though innocent, because of the persuasiveness of the victim’s false
identification.104
In such a case, built primarily on the victim’s
identification and with very little police or prosecutorial involvement, there
would be no cause of action against the police, prosecution, or victim.
2.

Individual, Supervisory, and Local Governmental Liability

Even in those cases in which it is possible to attribute the wrongful
conviction to law enforcement behavior, immunity doctrine protects most
participants in the criminal justice system from liability for damages. For
starters, a state cannot be sued for damages under § 1983 in either state or
federal court—unless the state has waived its immunity and subjected itself
to suit.105 Thus, if state employees’ activities resulted in a wrongful
conviction, the state itself could not be sued; plaintiffs could proceed only

1988); Kandekore v. Town of Greenburgh, 663 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App. Div. 1997)). This
Article does not discuss litigation in those circumstances when an arrest was made
without probable cause, which might give rise to a state law claim for false arrest or
malicious prosecution. Further,
[w]hen a defendant is arrested and jailed on the basis of probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime, and only later does police fraud enter
the
picture with the effect of perpetuating the seizure without good cause, there is
a
question not as yet authoritatively resolved whether the Fourth Amendment
has
been violated.

Gauger v. Hendle, 349 F.3d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 2003).
104.
When forced to choose between a victim’s identification testimony and an
accused’s alibi evidence, juries have believed eyewitnesses and convicted, despite the
heavy burden on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g.,
People v. Daniels, 453 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (App. Div. 1982) (reversing a conviction in a
case in which a jury believed an eyewitness identification over the defendant’s alibi
evidence).
105.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16, 19-20 (1890) (“The suability of a state,
without its consent, [is] a thing unknown to the law. This has been so often laid down
and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it is hardly necessary to be formally
asserted.”). Sometimes it is difficult to know whether a particular governmental
official is protected by the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., McMillian v.
Monroe, 520 U.S. 781, 793 (1997) (holding that a county sheriff represents the state,
not the county); Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a city prosecutor was acting as a state employee); Scott v. O’Grady, 975
F.2d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a county sheriff was a state employee working
pursuant to a state court order).
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against individual actors who, more often than not, lack “deep pockets.”
Cities and other municipal entities are not protected by state
immunity and can be sued under § 1983 for the activities of their
employees, but only if those activities were both unconstitutional and
performed in accordance with the “custom” or “policy” of the
municipality.106 In other words, if a police officer’s unconstitutional acts
were not authorized or sanctioned by the entity that employs him or her,
the officer might be personally liable under § 1983, but the entity would not
be.107 Should the officer’s unconstitutional behavior be proven to be
consistent with the rules of his department, his training, or the instructions
of a municipal policymaker,108 the municipality might be liable for the
activities.109
3.

Absolute and Qualified Immunity

Doctrines of absolute and qualified immunity protect individual
officials.110 Absolute immunity is a status immunity that protects
prosecutors from suit for decisions made and actions taken “initiating a
prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.”111 Judges are protected by

106.
107.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
If the plaintiff is limited to recovering against an individual officer or two,
the value of the claim is substantially reduced, because the officer might be judgment
proof, and the employing entity might refuse to indemnify the officer.
108.
A municipality may be liable for failure to train or supervise prosecutors
to ensure that they meet their constitutional obligation to turn over exculpatory
material to the defense. Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir.
1997) (reversing summary judgment on a claim of failure to adequately train); Walker
v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the city could be
liable for failure to train and supervise prosecutors on their obligation to disclose
exculpatory evidence); Johnson v. Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Office, 763 N.Y.S.2d
635, 649 (App. Div. 2003) (holding that a citizen might recover compensatory, but not
punitive, damages from the city under a theory of willful failure to train or supervise
employees).
109.
Pembar v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986).
110.
See, e.g., Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Although §
1983 does not expressly provide a defense of official immunity, our courts have
repeatedly recognized that absolute and qualified immunity shield certain types of
official conduct from § 1983 actions.”) (citing Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125-26
(1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 417 (1976)).
111.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431. Activities prosecutors undertake as
investigators, including taking statements at the scene of a crime or directing the police
investigation, enjoy only qualified immunity.
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absolute immunity for the work that they do in their official capacity.112
Testifying witnesses are protected as well.113
Police officers, however, have only “qualified immunity.”114
Providing the police with less immunity makes sense because the police
play the largest role in shaping an investigation. Police arrange lineups
through which identifications are made. They take statements, which form
powerful evidence at trial. They interview or fail to interview witnesses.
They collect or fail to preserve evidence.
On the other hand, many mistakes police make in the course of a
criminal investigation are immunized if it was objectively reasonable for
the officers to have believed, even incorrectly, that their behavior was
lawful.115 Because police are active decisionmakers and because judicial
interpretation of the law is in constant flux, courts protect police officers
from having to “predict[] the future course of constitutional law”116 and
encourage them to err on the side of active, vigorous enforcement.117
In making determinations about liability, courts distinguish between
negligent failure to investigate and a reckless or intentional failure.118 They
consider such factors as: urgency, the quantum of existing evidence, the

112.
113.

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
Complainants and witnesses are protected from liability unless the
prosecution is baseless and the complaint is made with malice. See generally Anthony
v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1992); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988);
Nardelli v. Stanberg, 377 N.E.2d 975 (1978).
114.
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
at 557).
115.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
116.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 557.
117.
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978) (stating that qualified
immunity “encourag[es] the vigorous exercise of official authority”).
118.
See AVERY ET AL., supra note 101, at 2-27. Compare Wilson v. Lawrence
County, 260 F.3d 946, 952-53 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that officers’ were not entitled to
qualified immunity when the defendant’s confession was coerced and involuntary), and
BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that officer should have
made further inquiry of witnesses at the time of arrest, which might have discredited
the basis for the arrest in a child neglect case), with Schertz v. Waupaca County, 875
F.2d 578, 583 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that once police officers have probable cause,
they have no constitutional obligation to conduct any further investigation in the hopes
of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence), and Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472,
1477-78 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that the police were not liable for the failure to
investigate the accused’s alibi witnesses), and Simmons v. McElveen, 846 F.2d 337, 339
(5th Cir. 1988) (finding police not liable for their failure to compare fingerprints left on
a cigarette box dropped by the assailant with prints of the accused).

BERNHARD 5.2.DOC

726

8/24/2004 3:27:13 PM

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 52

difficulty of continuing the investigation, and the seriousness of the charges
in making that determination.
Nonetheless, police are not shielded from liability for all conduct.
They are not protected if their conduct violates “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”119 Naturally, there has been litigation over the definition of a
“clearly established” constitutional right,120 and whether claimants are
required to prove that the police acted “bad faith” when they violated the
right.121 In resolving civil rights claims, courts resolve immunity questions
first.122 If a court determines that a plaintiff has not alleged a violation of a
clearly established right, the court will not address whether the proof is
sufficient to establish the violation.123
Judicial reluctance to interfere with the specifics of police work will
further erode. Exonerations force courts to take a less deferential look at
policing.
B. New Theories to Vindicate the Unjustly Convicted
In the next section, I look at a half-dozen recent cases in which
lawyers have used creative strategies to recover damages for individuals
wrongly accused, tried, and, in some cases, convicted. I have not limited
the discussion to cases in which plaintiffs were convicted and subsequently
exonerated, because some strategies used by those who were wrongly
accused but acquitted are equally applicable to suits on behalf of
exonerees. I do not purport to capture every imaginative use of federal
civil rights laws to vindicate those who have been wrongfully convicted, nor
do I analyze all the issues in great depth. Finally, because state law claims
are state-specific and variable, I do not explore or even inventory them. I
intend to provide an introduction to a complex and evolving subject and to

119.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see, e.g., Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. at 341 (discussing the Harlow standard in denying an officer’s claim of
immunity).
120.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999) (stating that for a legal
rule to be “clearly established,” there must be controlling precedent).
121.
See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (holding that a
plaintiff need not allege bad faith in a case against an official with qualified immunity).
122.
See, e.g., Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d at 1475-77 (ascertaining first whether the
plaintiff “sufficiently asserted the violation of a constitutional right” and answering any
other qualified immunity questions before addressing the merits).
123.
See, e.g., Home v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 250 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding
qualified immunity and therefore not reaching the merits).
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encourage more litigation.
1.

Failure to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence

In a criminal prosecution, the state must disclose to the defense all
exculpatory or helpful evidence124 that is material to the prosecution.125
Police have an affirmative duty to disclose such material to the
prosecution,126 and the prosecution must in turn reveal it to the defense.127
Brady material can take many shapes and forms, including: a prior
criminal record, psychiatric history, or other information relevant to
witness credibility,128 failure to make an identification of the accused,129
identification of someone other than the accused,130 information suggesting
that someone other than the accused is the perpetrator,131 cooperation
agreements with witnesses,132 or a witness’s prior inconsistent statement.133
Not surprisingly, the failure to disclose exculpatory material and
impeachment material to the defense has contributed to a substantial
number of wrongful convictions.134
If a convicted defendant locates Brady material that was not
disclosed, that person can attack the conviction and bring a motion for a
new trial.135 If the undisclosed evidence was material and likely to have
changed the outcome of the trial, the conviction will be reversed, and a new
124.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that information is
exculpatory if it is “favorable to the accused” either because it would “tend to
exculpate him” or because it undermines the credibility of a material witness).
125.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-36 (1995) (holding that evidence is
material if it undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial).
126.
Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992).
127.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87.
128.
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
129.
People v. Davis, 614 N.E.2d 719, 722 (N.Y. 1993).
130.
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“Impeachment
evidence . . . falls within the Brady rule.”) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at
154).
131.
See id. (“[E]xculpatory evidence . . . falls within the Brady rule.”) (citing
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 154).
132.
People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 509, 512 (N.Y. 1993).
133.
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (“Impeachment evidence . . .
falls within the Brady rule.”) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 154).
134.
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, CASE PROFILES, supra note 64.
135.
See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 154 (“A new trial is required if
‘the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment
of the jury . . . .’”) (quoting Naupe v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)) (alterations in
original).
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trial will be ordered.136
Once the criminal case has been resolved, either by acquittal after the
retrial or dismissal, the exonerated person might be able to use the Brady
violation as the basis for a civil rights lawsuit.137 The exoneree would argue
that the failure to disclose evidence that substantially undercut the police
case against the accused or that clearly pointed to the accused’s innocence
was a violation of the suspect’s constitutional due process rights; such
violations are actionable under § 1983 if there is a loss of liberty as a result
of the violation.138 Because prosecutors are absolutely immune for even an
intentional concealment of Brady material,139 the only way an exonerated
plaintiff could recover would be to establish the police had the exculpatory
or impeachment material and failed to turn it over to the prosecution.
Many questions and difficulties arise. Plaintiffs must establish that
the harm suffered—the conviction and time in jail—resulted directly from
the constitutional violation.140 Plaintiffs must further show that the
undisclosed material was Brady material, i.e., that it was either exculpatory
or valuable for its impeachment potential.
The reversal of a highly publicized child sexual assault case gave the
New York Appellate Division, First Department, an opportunity to rule
that a city agency’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the district
attorney and the district attorney’s failure to search for, gather, and
disclose that material to the defense constitutes a violation of the plaintiff’s
civil rights.141 Mr. Ramos was convicted and sentenced to prison for the

136.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 677 (citing Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. at 154).
137.
See Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299 (2d Cir. 1992)
(addressing a case in which an exonerated person brought action against the City of
New York under § 1983).
138.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003) (stating every person who, acting under color
of state law, subjects another to the deprivation of rights under the Constitution shall
be liable for injuries).
139.
See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (discussing absolute
immunity for prosecutors under § 1983).
140.
See, e.g., Jones v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 702 F.2d 203, 207 (9th Cir. 1983)
(stating that a § 1983 plaintiff is entitled “to compensation [only] for actual harm
resulting directly” from the violation of federal rights) (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 260 & n.15 (1978); Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 667 F.2d 773, 781 (9th Cir.
1982)).
141.
Ramos v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d 678, 692-95 (App. Div. 2001),
aff’d, 762 N.Y.S.2d 807 (App. Div. 2003).
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sexual abuse of a small child.142 When accused, Mr. Ramos was a college
student, working part time as a teacher’s aide.143 The Human Resources
Administration (HRA) conducted the investigation into the accusation.144
The child was examined physically and psychologically, and experts
determined that the child had been abused.145
HRA investigators knew that the child had a history of strangely
inappropriate sexual behavior and had made other false complaints.146 For
some reason, HRA was slow to release the material to the prosecution, and
the assistant district attorney assigned to the trial failed to inform the
defense about the material.147 As a result, Mr. Ramos served almost a
decade in prison convicted by the testimony of the youngster, doctors, and
social worker “validators” who believed that abuse had occurred.148
During discovery in a civil case brought by the child and her mother against
the day care center for failure to protect the child, the previously
undisclosed reports surfaced.149 Mr. Ramos brought a motion to set aside
his conviction.150 After the conviction was vacated as a result of the Brady
violation and the indictment was dismissed, Mr. Ramos sued for damages
in state court.151 He asserted against the investigating agency, HRA, the
tort of malicious prosecution, on the theory that the Brady information
would have erased any probable cause justifying his arrest and
prosecution.152 He charged the city under § 1983 with violating his due
process right to a fair trial by permitting the assistant district attorney to
ignore her duty to disclose Brady material.153
On appeal from the trial court decision denying the city’s request for
summary judgment, the First Department held the Brady violation
actionable under § 1983.154 The court found that a valid state law malicious
prosecution claim was asserted against the city for HRA’s selectively
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 685.
Id. at 682.
Id.
Id. at 683.
Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 683-84.
See id. at 685 (noting that judgment was rendered on June 12, 1985 and
that Ramos was released on June 2, 1992).
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Id. at 685-86.
152.
Id. at 686.
153.
Id.
154.
Id. at 692.
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reported misleading information and intentional withholding of material
and relevant exculpatory information.155 The court also found New York
City responsible under § 1983 for the local district attorney’s failure to
institute adequate policies and to ensure that assistant district attorneys
recognize and act on their responsibilities to search for, collect, and
disclose Brady material.156 The court found that when a municipal
employee acts in violation of a person’s federal civil rights, pursuant to
municipal policy or custom, then it is the municipality that acts improperly,
even if the individual employee is immune.157 The suit was eventually
settled for five million dollars to compensate for the seven years spent in
jail.158
Very strong facts facilitated the Appellate Division’s decision.
Discovery established that the Office of the Bronx District Attorney
routinely ignored the Brady rights of accused persons. The district
attorney who tried the case against Mr. Ramos testified that her decision
not to disclose the exculpatory materials was made in conformity with her
training.159 That testimony could have convinced a jury that office policy
and training led her to withhold the information that should have been
disclosed.160 Particularly convincing were facts that no prosecutor in the
office had ever been disciplined for failure to disclose Brady material and
that ten other cases had been reversed for Brady violations.161
Similar issues arose in Carroccia v. Anderson.162 After being tried and
acquitted in criminal court, John Carroccia brought an action complaining
that the police had violated his due process right to a fair trial by failing to
inform the prosecution of exculpatory evidence discovered during the

155.
156.
157.

Id. at 689.
Id. at 692-93.
Id. at 692 (citing Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir.
1992)). “When a District Attorney evinces a pattern of ignoring law enforcement
improprieties and misconduct, or fails to train and supervise ADA’s regarding Brady
and other legal obligations, such management failures correlate with defects in the
District Attorney’s role as a local policymaker.” Id. at 693 (citations omitted). Thus,
“where prosecutors, pursuant to policy or custom, conceal exculpatory evidence,” they
are county employees, not state employees. Id. (citations omitted).
158.
Sean Gardiner, $5 Million Cannot Undo 7 Years: City Settles over Wrong
Conviction, NEWSDAY (New York, N.Y.), Dec. 17, 2003, available at
http://injusticebusters.com/2003/Ramos_Albert.htm.
159.
Ramos v. City of New York, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Carroccia v. Anderson, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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course of the investigation.163 The police knew that the wife of the man
Carroccia was accused of killing had a “flawed alibi.”164 They knew she did
not have a “normal reaction upon hearing of her husband’s murder,” and
they knew she “possessed firearms, which she claimed to have used.”165
While the police might not have been civilly liable for their failure to
conduct a thorough investigation, or for focusing on a single suspect too
early in the investigation, the court permitted the due process claim under
§ 1983 on the theory that the “‘officers withheld information or evidence
necessary for the fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution . . . .’”166 In other words, the court did not hold the police
liable for failure to act upon the receipt of new information, but held them
liable for their failure to tell the prosecutors about the new information so
that the prosecutors could have evaluated the case in light of all the
developments, and perhaps dismissed the case, sparing the plaintiff the
humiliation and anxiety of a trial.167
2.

Failure to Accurately Describe Investigation as a Brady Violation

The failure of the police to accurately describe an interrogation or
identification procedure can be a violation of the Brady doctrine.168 Thus,
when police shape evidence and conceal that activity from the prosecution,
they violate the defendant’s due process rights.169 For example, if the
police stage an identification procedure geared to ensure identification of
the person they believe to be guilty, and then fail to accurately describe the
rigged procedure so that the prosecution can independently evaluate the

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1020.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1023 (quoting Ienco v. City of Chicago, 286 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir.
2002)). It was irrelevant that Carroccia was acquitted at trial. A favorable outcome
does not render the trial fair, or neutralize police failure to comply with Brady
obligations. Id.
167.
Id. at 1023-24.
168.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the
prosecution’s failure to disclose favorable evidence to the defendant “violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment”).
169.
See Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that
the defendant had a viable Brady claim because investigators created false evidence);
Ienco v. City of Chicago, 286 F.3d at 1000 (“Neither the withholding of exculpatory
information nor the initiation of constitutionally infirm criminal proceedings is
protected by absolute immunity.”); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 989, 994, 995
(7th Cir. 1988) (condemning police for concealing the weakness of the identification,
evidence leading to other individuals, and lack of probable cause for arrest of accused).
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reliability of the resulting identification, the police have violated Brady.
That is exactly what happened in James Newsome’s case. James
Newsome was convicted of murdering Edward Cohen.170 During the
investigation, two officers displayed photos to the identifying witnesses
before the lineup “to improve the chance that [the witnesses] would pick
Newsome.”171 The court held that the officers would not be entitled to
qualified immunity if they induced the witnesses to falsely testify and then
concealed their improper activities from the prosecution.172 Swayed by the
importance placed on eyewitness testimony by jurors and by recent studies
showing how easily such testimony can be manipulated, the court found
that the manipulation of the identifications “would not by itself support an
award of damages,” but “obstruct[ing] the ability of the prosecutors and
defense counsel to get at the truth in the criminal trial” would support the
jury’s award of damages,173 which in this case amounted to fifteen million
dollars.174
Not all of the federal circuit courts are comfortable permitting civil
rights suits for police failure to disclose exculpatory information. For
example, the Fourth Circuit requires plaintiffs to establish bad faith on the
part of the police—at least when plaintiff’s proof of innocence (and thus
injury and entitlement to damages) is equivocal, and when the asserted
police misconduct is overshadowed by the prosecutorial misconduct that is
protected by immunity.175 In 1982, Lesly Jean was arrested and convicted
of sexual assault.176 During the investigation, a police officer and the victim
were hypnotized to help them recall more details about the perpetrator’s
appearance.177 Their descriptions changed as the result of the hypnotism
and various suggestions made by the investigating officers.178 The full
picture of how the investigation proceeded and the extent of the hypnotic
influence on the witnesses was not disclosed to the defense in a timely

170.
171.
172.
173.

Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 302 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 304 (referring to discussion in Newsome v. McCabe, 260 F.3d 824,
824 (7th Cir. 2001)).
174.
Id. at 303; Editorial, When Believing Isn’t Seeing, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30,
2002, at 16.
175.
Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 660-61 (4th Cir. 2000).
176.
Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), vacated by 526
U.S. 1142 (1999).
177.
Id. at 703-04.
178.
Id. at 704.
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manner.179 As a result, Mr. Jean’s postconviction writ of habeas corpus was
granted, and he was released from prison.180 The state did not retry his
case.181 Neither innocence nor guilt was ever established. Mr. Jean
brought a § 1983 action asking for damages as a result of a due process
violation.182
Although enough exculpatory material had been withheld to
undercut the court’s confidence in the verdict, the court refused to impose
liability on the police for the Brady violation, holding that the police are
not liable for failure to transmit information to the prosecution unless they
act in bad faith.183 The decision seems to have been prompted by a couple
of factors.
First, as the court reviewed the facts, it was clear that some of the
information relating to the hypnosis of the officer and victim had been
disclosed to the prosecution and that the prosecution had kept it under
wraps.184 The prosecutor stated that “the officers had ‘informed [him] of
the existence of the hypnosis and identification procedures’” and that
“‘there were some changes in [the witness’s] description after hypnosis’. . .
.”185 Thus, the court stated that it would be unfair to blame the police—
who are only qualifiedly immune—when the prosecution was more at fault
and also protected by absolute immunity.186 Further, the court was not
convinced by plaintiff’s assertion that the police knew that they had failed
to disclose all of the material in their possession, or understood that the
material was exculpatory.187
Moreover, the court may have been
influenced by the fact that Jean had not conclusively established his
innocence.
In any event, the discussion could have ended with a determination
that Jean had failed to make out his case, but it did not. Analogizing to
Arizona v. Youngblood,188 the Fourth Circuit held that, absent “bad faith,”

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id. at 704-05.
Id. at 705.
Id.
Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 660-61 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 662.
Id.
Id.
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (holding that there is no
due process violation for failure to preserve potentially exculpatory material in absence
of bad faith).
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a Brady violation is not a constitutional violation actionable though §
1983.189 The decision is misguided.
The Fourth Circuit’s bad-faith requirement is unfairly protective of
the police and sends the wrong message to law enforcement. Holding the
police accountable would have had the salutary effect of requiring police to
accurately describe their investigation and ensuring that all details are
transmitted to the prosecution. In state criminal work, police conduct
investigations on their own with very little direction and assistance from
the prosecution. Only the police have access to witnesses’ inconsistent
statements, hesitations, and misidentifications made during the
investigation. Although the ultimate duty to evaluate the case and decide
what to disclose falls upon the prosecution, none of that discretionary
decision making can occur unless the police disclose what they have
uncovered.
It would have been better to insist that police make extensive notes
regarding their investigations and strictly mandate that all information be
turned over to the prosecution. Recordkeeping advances truth seeking.190
Imposition of a bad-faith requirement permits police to bury information
with the excuse that they did not know they were supposed to disclose it,
and gives tacit permission to leave the tape machine off, fail to record
witness interviews and tips, and to keep street files.191
3.

Fabrication of Evidence: False Confessions and Fake Science

When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a
jury’s decision and passes that information along to prosecutors, he or she
violates the accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial,192 and that harm is
actionable.193 False evidence can be concrete: a suspect’s bootprint
189.
190.

Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d at 662.
See generally David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police
Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455 (1999).
191.
“Street files” are police files withheld from prosecutors. See, e.g., Jones v.
City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988).
192.
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 112 (1935)).
193.
Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1030-31 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
appellee’s claim was actionable because the FBI agents did not qualify for immunity
when they provided a jailhouse informant with details of the crime they wanted to
charge the accused with and induced him to create a false story); Spurlock v.
Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1006-07 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that the appellant was not
protected by either absolute or qualified immunity because his actions, which included
manufacturing a false statement by a jailhouse informant, violated the accused’s clearly
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planted at the scene of the crime in order to “solidify” the evidence,194 or
intangible: a “confession,” the details of which were suggested to the
suspect.195
Confessions are powerful evidence of guilt.196 While many varieties
of evidence are equivocal, a confession is generally direct, straightforward,
and inculpatory. Imagine a homicide investigation: A married woman is
killed at home. She was having an affair. She had an insurance policy
benefiting her husband. After her corpse is found, police discover that a
ground floor window in the home is open. There are fingerprints on the
window frame that do not match those of anyone who lives in or regularly
visits the home. If the husband claimed to have returned from work to find
his wife lying murdered on the carpet, he would be suspected and
investigated, but the police would probably continue to pursue other leads
while they questioned him. However, if the husband confessed, the case
would likely be closed. The jury would find the evidence against the
husband convincing. The open window would be explained away.197 Until
recently, jurors refused to believe that innocent people confessed to crimes
they did not commit.198 Thus, confessions were trusted, and attempts to
deny confessions were not.
The power of confessions encourages police to obtain them in as
many cases as possible. That desire prompts police to spend time
interrogating suspects and encourages hard-to-detect cheating, such as
feeding details to the suspect so that the resulting statement will have
convincing verisimilitude.
Courts have held that it is a violation of a suspect’s constitutional

established constitutional rights).
194.
Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999).
195.
Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 902-03 (11th Cir. 1990).
196.
See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“No other class of evidence is so profoundly prejudicial.”).
197.
See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 87, at 429 (“Because a confession is
universally treated as damning and compelling evidence of guilt, it is likely to dominate
all other case evidence and lead a trier of fact to convict the defendant. A false
confession is therefore an exceptionally dangerous piece of evidence to put before
anyone adjudicating a case. In a criminal justice system whose formal rules are
designed to minimize the frequency of unwarranted arrest, unjustified prosecution, and
wrongful conviction, police-induced false confessions rank amongst the most fateful of
all official errors.”).
198.
Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards
Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 134 (1997).
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rights to induce a false confession and use it against the suspect at trial.199
Moreover, arranging for the target of an investigation to be lodged in a jail
cell with a known informant—who had previously falsified information and
perjured himself—and then using the resultant overheard confession is
actionable if the confession is proved to be false.200
No arrest, no matter how lawful or objectively reasonable, gives an
arresting officer or his fellow officers license to deliberately
manufacture false evidence against an arrestee. To hold that police
officers, having lawfully arrested a suspect, are then free to fabricate
false confessions at will, would make a mockery of the notion that
Americans enjoy the protection of due process of the law and
fundamental justice.201

Courts have not hesitated to find a constitutional violation, and juries
have not hesitated to award damages. In May 2004, a Long Island jury
awarded Shonnard Lee two million dollars because police arrested him
without probable cause and lied when they said Lee had confessed.202
C. Suits Against Defenders for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Courts are reconsidering their traditional disinclination to hold public
defenders liable for those actions that directly contributed to wrongful
convictions. Currently, while courts have refused to extend immunity
protection to public defenders, they have not yet dismantled the barriers
that make “it difficult for criminal defendants to sue their counsel.”203 For
example, “[o]n the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that when a
public defender” acts as an individual attorney representing an individual
client, “that lawyer is not a state actor and is thus not amenable to suit
under the federal civil rights laws.”204 On the other hand, state malpractice
tort theory is difficult to use against public defenders.205 Moreover, some
199.
See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (affirming the
“clearly established” test of voluntariness in determining that use of a coerced
confession violates due process).
200.
Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 2004).
201.
Ricciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 124 F.2d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997).
202.
Chau Lam, $2M in Faulty Arrest; Jury Concludes Ex-LI Man Was
Charged Without Sufficient Evidence and That Cops Fabricated Confession, NEWSDAY
(Long Island, N.Y.), May 19, 2004, at A7.
203.
Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2003, at 37, 41.
204.
Id. (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)).
205.
Id.
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“states treat individual public defenders as civil servants with individual
immunity.”206 Finally, “damages won against public defender offices are
often capped.”
Commentators abhor these protections because they see them as
violations of accuseds’ rights and obstacles to improving the performance
of public defenders.207 “Their voices are being heard.”208
In Nevada, a former client of the public defender in Clark County
claimed the defender organization used the polygraph exam to
differentiate between clients.209 “Miranda claimed that the chief defender
required” all clients to undergo lie detector tests “and provided fewer
investigative and defense resources to those who failed.”210 Miranda
asserted this practice was a deliberate pattern—not an isolated instance—
and that it was part of an unwillingness to properly supervise and train
attorneys.211 “Miranda claimed that no investigation was conducted on his
case as a result of the test results.”212
Affirming the district court determination, the Ninth Circuit
found that Miranda’s allegations, if proven, would be sufficient to
establish against the public defender office and the county a claim of
deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, reachable under the
leading Supreme Court decisions on state and municipal liability, such
as Monell v. Department of Social Services.213

It is unlikely that another public defender office has used polygraph
tests as Miranda alleged Nevada did.214 But unfortunately, “[m]ost public
defender organizations provide little guidance”—in training or

206.
Id. (citing Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1978)).
207.
Id. (citing Harold H. Chen, Note, Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimate
and Ineffective Response to the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45 DUKE L.J. 783 (1996); David
A. Sadoff, Note, The Public Defender as Private Offender: A Retreat from Evolving
Malpractice Liability Standards for Public Defenders, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 883 (1995);
David J. Richards, Note, The Public Defender Defendant: A Model Statutory Approach
to Public Defender Malpractice Liability, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 511 (1994)).
208.
Id.
209.
Id. (citing Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 2003)).
210.
Id. at 41-42.
211.
Id. at 42.
212.
Id. (citing Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d at 468).
213.
Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
214.
Id.
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supervision—to their staff.215 Following the lead of the Miranda decision,
other innocent public defender clients, upon release from jail, are likely to
sue the defender office that provided representation for its failure to train
and supervise staff.216 “The Miranda v. Clark County decision condemned
an affirmative policy as systemically ineffective, but there is no reason why
another organization’s omissions or failures might not likewise be
considered bureaucratic malfeasance establishing liability.”217
As more innocent individuals are exonerated, the public and courts
will demand more from police and prosecutors.218 “The police are already
paying for careless work through larger jury verdicts and settlements. . . .
The defense bar may find itself in the same position soon.”219
IV. CONCLUSION
In the absence of generous, practical, and popular compensation
statutes, exonerees will turn to the courts for vindication. Eventually their
lawsuits will be successful. Exonerees have compelling stories and
sympathetic claims. Moreover, each exoneration reveals unprofessional, if
not criminal, law enforcement activity. While compensation statutes are
more equitable—and ultimately less expensive for states—courts will not
wait for the legislature to act.

215.
216.

Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Mary Gallagher, First Exoneration, Next Compensation?, N.J.
L.J., Feb. 13, 2004, at 4 (stating that John Dixon is suing “the New Jersey Public
Defender’s Office, alleging that for 10 years it turned a deaf ear to his requests for
DNA testing”). Dixon served ten years in jail, after pleading guilty. Id. He claims to
have been influenced by his attorney to enter the plea and then immediately regretted
his decision. Id. He says the court would not allow him to change his mind and that his
requests for testing, made for the first time at sentencing, were brushed aside by the
court and Dixon’s public defender.
217.
Bernhard, supra note 203, at 42.
218.
Id.
219.
Id.

